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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the regressive effects of gasoline taxation in the UK. When all households 
are considered, middle-income households suffer most of the burden. When only car-owning 
households are considered gasoline taxation is strongly regressive. Low-income households that 
own a car are more severely affected than high income ones because they spend a larger 
proportion of their income on motoring. This conclusion is similar to that from previous studies 
on the topic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fuel protests that brought parts of the UK’s road network to a standstill in the summer of 
2000 prompted a renewed interest in both the level of gasoline taxation and its distributional 
consequences amongst the general public. While real fuel duty rose steadily throughout the 
1990s, so that taxation at its peak accounted for almost 86% of the retail price of unleaded 
gasoline in March 1999, concern arose over the effects of gasoline taxation upon low-income 
groups and those living in rural areas. 
This paper analyzes the regressivity of fuel taxation in the UK. The results show that when all 
households are considered, middle-income households suffer most of the burden and that when 
only car-owning households are considered gasoline taxation is strongly regressive. This 
conclusion is very much in line with previous work on the topic. 
Johnson et al (1) analyze the distributional effects of increases in fuel duties in the UK using 
simulation results from a consumer demand model. They conclude that the effects are 
progressive because car-ownership is much lower amongst low-income groups. Wiese et al (2) 
conclude that the greater the proportion of motor-fuel tax revenue devoted to general uses, the 
greater is the absolute and relative burden of the lowest income household, and the more 
regressive is the policy with respect to the overall distributional structure. Blow and Crawford 
(3) find that rising fuel taxes is progressive if all households are considered but regressive if only 
car owning households are considered. Asensio et al (4) use micro data from the Spanish 
Household Budget Survey of 1990/91 and show that fuel taxes are regressive, and the degree of 
regressiveness raises the smaller the size of the municipality considered. For the smallest 
municipalities they find the most regressive effects. On the other hand they do find that fuel 
taxes seem to be slightly progressive in the largest cities of their sample. Blow and Crawford (3) 
also observe that the effect of a duty increase falls with population density, probably because 
there are better substitutes for private motoring. 
All these studies show that in general, when car-owning households are considered fuel taxes 
are regressive. In this paper newer data is used to provide an updated view of the distributional 
consequences of gasoline taxation in the UK, and the potential consequences if fuel duties were 
Georgina Santos and Tom Catchesides 
 
3 
increased. There were plans to increase duties in September 2004 but these were postponed, 
mainly because of the high and volatile world oil prices. 
 
Fuel Tax Policy in the UK 1993-2004 
The rising share of taxation in the retail price of road fuel between 1993 and 1999 was due to 
automatic increases in fuel duty of a fixed percentage over inflation, a mechanism known as the 
‘escalator’, introduced by the Conservatives and continued by the Labour Government. Although 
the actual reason for the fuel escalator was the need for revenues, the Government claimed the 
idea was to reduce traffic growth and emissions. In the March 1993 Budget, this escalator was 
set at 3% before being increased to 5% the following November. The escalator was increased to 
6% in March 1997 and abolished in November 1999, with any further increases to be decided on 
a Budget-by-Budget basis. 
In the summer and autumn of 2000, there was an increase in the world price of crude oil, 
which combined with high fuel taxes, caused an important increase in the final price of fuel, as 
shown on Figure 1. This resulted in a fuel tax protest that triggered shortages, panic buying and 
traffic chaos across the UK. Although the economic self-interest of the motoring majority clearly 
played a role in the fuel crisis, much of the language used by the protestors was couched in terms 
of concern for low-income and rural households, who were widely perceived as suffering 
disproportionately from rising gasoline prices (5). 
Figure 1 shows the three components of the retail price of unleaded gasoline, the pre-tax 
price, duty and Value Added Tax, which is applied to the sum of the pre-tax price and duty, for 
the period January 1990 - October 2004. It can be seen that, although an increase in the pre-tax 
price of unleaded gasoline was responsible for much of the rise in its retail price in the run-up to 
the summer of 2000, the share of the retail price attributable to taxation rose steadily throughout 
the 1990s. In October 2000 the fuel duty on ultra-low sulphur gasoline, which at the time was 
difficult to find at gasoline stations, was cut down by 1 pence per litre. In March 2001 it was 
further cut down by two pence and this is the reduction that can be seen on the figure. At that 
point most drivers switched from unleaded gasoline to unleaded ultra-low sulphur gasoline, and 
so the rest of the graph refers to ultra-low sulphur gasoline, which accounts for virtually all 
unleaded gasoline sold in the UK. In October 2003 the duty was increased by 2 pence per litre 
and it remained at that level until October 2004. As of November 2004 there have been no 
further changes. 
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FIGURE 1 Components of the retail price of unleaded gasoline 
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Source: Department of Trade and Industry, Quarterly Energy Prices Update, October 2004 
(Table 4.1.1: Typical monthly retail prices of gasolineeum products and a crude oil price index, 
www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_prices/#listoftables) 
 
 
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF GASOLINE TAXATION 
Figures 2 and 3 plot an Engel curve of the share of road fuel expenditure in income for 
households in the UK. Figure 2 plots the relationship for all households, while Figure 3 does the 
same for car-owning households alone. From Figure 2, it would seem that road fuel is a luxury 
for low-income households (because the budget share of road fuel increases with income) and a 
necessity for high-income households (because the budget share of road fuel generally decreases 
with income). However, Figure 3 shows that road fuel is a necessity for car-owning households 
because the budget share of road fuel consistently declines with income. The difference between 
these two figures can be attributed to low levels of car-ownership among lower-income 
households: although road fuel occupies a large proportion of poorer car-owning households’ 
income, the fact that relatively few low-income households own cars means that, when all 
households are considered, road fuel accounts for a relatively small share of their incomes. 
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FIGURE 2 Income share of gasoline costs for all households by income decile 
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Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1999-2000 
 
 
FIGURE 3 Income share of gasoline costs for car-owning households by income decile 
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Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1999-2000 
 
 
Because the budget share of road fuel varies across the population, it is likely that the burden 
of a rise in fuel taxes will also vary across different levels of household income. From the 
relationship between income and budget share shown in Figure 2, it would seem likely that low-
income car-owning households would suffer relatively badly from such a rise, compared to 
higher-income households, because expenditure on road fuel accounts for a larger share of their 
income. 
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Blow and Crawford (3) and Smith (5) measure the impact of a rise in fuel duty in terms of a 
cost-of-living index, which compares the cost of achieving a given level of economic welfare 
before the tax increase with the cost of achieving the same level of economic welfare after the 
tax increase. Using data for the UK from the National Travel Survey (NTS) from 1988 to 1993, 
Blow and Crawford (3) estimate the average increase in the cost-of-living index of a 6% real 
increase in duties (which corresponds to the escalator that was in use until November 1999) 
across all households to be 0.17%, rising to 0.25% for car-owning households alone. They show 
that the effect of a duty increase varies systematically across income deciles, with lower-income 
households being affected more severely than higher-income households. Additionally, the effect 
of a duty increase is observed to fall with population density, so that the cost-of-living index 
rises more for rural than urban households. Smith (5) confirms this generalized pattern using 
income, price and mileage data extrapolated to 1997, showing that a 6% real increase in duty 
raised the cost of living by over 0.35% for the poorest income decile, falling to around 0.15% for 
the richest income decile. Again, the rise in the cost-of-living index is shown to be higher for 
rural households than for urban households. 
From these figures, it would appear that there is cause for concern about the distributional 
effects of gasoline taxation in the UK because those who can least afford it (ie, low-income 
households) and those who depend upon private vehicles in the absence of high-quality public 
transport services (ie, rural households) are most severely affected by a rise in fuel duty. 
However, the question remains as to whether the findings presented in Blow and Crawford (3) 
and Smith (5) are still relevant today and, if so, whether the nature of the effects they described 
has changed at all. The rest of this analysis will be devoted to addressing this question. 
 
THE MODEL 
Following Blow and Crawford (3), a cost-of-living index is used in this paper to measure the 
welfare effects of a rise in gasoline taxation for different groups of households, which may then 
be used to assess the distributional effects of gasoline taxation. If the pre-reform level of welfare 
is denoted U0, the set of pre-reform prices p0, the set of post-reform prices pT and the cost 
function (which is the minimum expenditure necessary to reach a certain level of welfare, U, 
given a set of prices, p) is c(p,U), then the cost-of-living index is: 
 
        Cost-of-living index = 
c pT ,U0 
c p0 ,U0 
           (1) 
 
In order to measure the distributional consequences of gasoline taxation in the UK, cost-of-
living indices will be constructed for different groups both across the range of household 
incomes and across population densities. A 6% real rise in fuel duty will be considered. Bearing 
in mind that the escalator was ended in November 1999, this figure may seem somewhat 
arbitrary. The objective of the exercise however is to assess what the distributional impacts 
would be if there was such an increase. 6% also represents government policy in the run-up to 
the 2000 fuel protests. Finally, choosing a figure of 6% also allows direct comparison with Blow 
and Crawford (3) and Smith (5). However, since it is difficult to derive the true cost function 
used in the cost-of-living index, an approximation to it will be used in its place. This will be 
considered in the next section. 
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Behavioral responses 
One purpose of gasoline taxation, apart of course of raising revenues, is to change individuals’ 
behavior, namely the amount of fuel they consume and, to a lesser extent, the number of miles 
they drive. It therefore becomes important to accommodate behavioral changes when calculating 
a cost-of-living index to assess the welfare effect of a rise in gasoline taxation if the results are 
not to be unnecessarily biased. 
A first-order approximation to the welfare effect holds demand constant. The welfare effect 
would simply be the difference in expenditure on the same set of goods before and after the tax 
reform, and the cost-of-living index would be approximated by: 
 
          Cost-of-living index  
00
0
qp
qpT            (2) 
 
It should be noted that this index is expressed in terms of the set of goods bought before the 
reform, q0, rather than the pre-reform level of welfare used in equation (1). 
Banks et al (6) present data that suggest that in the case of tax reforms, which often involve 
substantial rather than marginal changes in price, so that substitution effects are likely to be non-
trivial, a second-order approximation to the welfare effect will be an improvement over a first-
order one, which does not allow for any behavioral response. First-order approximations 
systematically over-estimate the social welfare effect of price changes, while second-order 
approximations act to correct this bias; for a price increase of 10-20%, they calculate that a 
second-order term reduces this bias by as much as 5-10 percentage points of the total welfare 
effect. 
Following Blow and Crawford (3), a second-order approximation to the welfare effect will be 
used here. Such an approximation incorporates a demand response, which requires the welfare-
constant demand response to be calculated. The cost-of-living index is approximated by 
 
 
c pT ,U0 
c p0 ,U0 

pTq0
p0q0

pT  p0 
2
2p0q0

q
p
UU 0
          (3) 
 
where the welfare-constant demand response is given by (4), in which ey and ep are the income 
and own-price elasticities of the demand for road fuel, respectively: 
 
       













p
q
eq
y
q
e
p
q
py
UU 0


           (4) 
 
In order to estimate a second-order approximation to the cost-of-living index, these elasticities 
need to be estimated. 
 
Model specification 
A simple model of car usage based upon that presented in Blow and Crawford (3) will be used to 
estimate the behavioral response of drivers to the increased cost of mileage brought about by a 
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rise in gasoline taxation. The results produced will be used to calculate the welfare-constant 
demand response used in estimating the effect of a rise in gasoline taxation upon welfare. 
Espey (7) surveys a range of empirical estimates of income and own-price elasticities for the 
demand for road fuel, and presents a list of variables that have proved statistically significant in 
these models. They include car ownership, fuel efficiency, regional dummy variables, population 
density, the availability of public transport and the ages of the individuals surveyed. While most 
of these variables are used both here and in Blow and Crawford (3), both models are limited to 
the short-run only and do not allow for changes in the vehicle stock. It is therefore likely that the 
long-run response of fuel consumption and miles driven will differ from the response estimated 
here, which only allows for changes in mileage given the current stock of cars. The model used 
here also differs from that of Blow and Crawford (3) by omitting the term they use to correct for 
selectivity bias, which is caused by the fact that mileages are only observed for those households 
whose demand for mileage is sufficient for them to own a car. This term requires a separate 
equation to be estimated in addition to the mileage equation, and so has been omitted from the 
model presented here for reasons of simplicity. Additionally, variables such as the real price of 
public transport and the proportion of company cars in the household have been omitted from the 
model used here for the same reason. Although Blow and Crawford (3) estimate separate 
equations for one-car and two-car households, because the 1998 edition of the NTS contains less 
data than the 1988-1993 data set used by them, a single equation for all car-owning households is 
estimated here in order to achieve sufficiently low standard errors. 
The model estimated here is a log-linear model that regresses log mileage against the real cost 
per mile (CPM) of driving, which is the price of road fuel divided by the fuel efficiency of the 
household’s vehicles. This functional form tells us the relationship between proportional changes 
in mileage and absolute changes in CPM. It also allows the demand response to CPM to vary 
with the level of demand, which is a key issue in assessing the distributional effects of a rise in 
CPM due to a rise in gasoline taxation, whereas a log-log model imposes the restriction that the 
own-price elasticity of demand for mileage is constant for all households. Again following Blow 
and Crawford (3), the issue of the endogeneity of CPM is dealt with by using the average CPM 
for all households in the same region as an instrument for any particular household’s CPM. The 
endogeneity problem arises because a correlation between demand for miles and CPM may be 
produced by households with a high demand for mileage seeking to reduce their CPM through 
mechanisms such as driving more slowly in order to conserve fuel. The regional average of CPM 
is a reasonable predictor of households’ CPM, but is not endogenous because it is not a choice 
variable in this short-run model. 
A full list of the variables used in the mileage equation used here is presented in Table 1. It 
should be noted that the dummy variables for full-time employment, unskilled manual work, 
population density > 35 persons per hectare in the household’s local authority and living in 
London have been omitted from the estimated equation to avoid perfect multicollinearity. The 
estimated coefficients therefore represent deviations from a baseline model of a head of 
household in full-time, unskilled manual employment living in a local authority in London with 
more than 35 persons per hectare. 
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TABLE 1 Variables used in mileage equation 
 
  Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
    ln(miles) Real cost per mile 
 ln(real income) 
 [ln(real income)]
2 
 Age of head of household 
 [Age of head of household]
2 
 Part-time employee 
 Unemployed 
 Retired 
 Domestic work 
 Self-employed 
 Professional 
 Non-manual 
 Skilled manual 
 Number of children 
 Bus available and frequent 
 Rail available and frequent 
 Pop. density of local authority < 3.5 people per hectare 
 Pop. density of local authority 3.5-9.9 people per hectare 
 Pop. density of local authority 10-19.9 people per hectare 
 Pop. density of local authority 20.34.9 people per hectare 
 Standard region 
    North 
    Yorkshire & Humberside 
    East Midlands 
    East Anglia 
    South East 
    South West 
    West Midlands 
    North West 
    Wales & Scotland 
   
 
Data 
The annual NTS contains extensive cross-sectional data on individuals’ and households’ 
travelling habits as well as other characteristics such as individuals’ income, age, and access to 
public transport. Blow and Crawford (3) use data from the NTS for 1988 to 1993 to estimate 
their mileage equation, but more recent data have since become available and the 1998 edition of 
the NTS, sourced from the UK Data Archive at the University of Essex, will be used for the 
purposes of this analysis. However, extensive work was required in adapting the NTS data into a 
format suitable for running household-level regressions. 
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Once the behavioral response of drivers to a rise in gasoline taxation has been estimated, this 
information will be combined with income and expenditure data taken from the 1999-2000 
edition of the Family Expenditure Survey to estimate the impact of the tax reform upon 
households’ cost-of-living indices. Again, this data has been sourced from the UK Data Archive 
at the University of Essex. 
 
Elasticities 
Using the estimated coefficients from the model presented above, income and own-price 
elasticities for the demand for road fuel will be derived as follows for each of the income and 
population density categories considered. These categories are produced by dividing the sample 
into income and population density quintiles, creating a total of 25 discrete categories ranging 
from the poorest households living in the least densely populated areas to the richest households 
living in the most densely populated areas. Since log mileage is being regressed against CPM, 
the own-price elasticity for mileage is 
 
    
q
p

p
q

 ln q
p
 p             (5) 
 
where  ln q p  is the estimated coefficient on CPM and p is the average CPM for the category 
being considered. Since both log(income) and (log[income])
2
 are included as explanatory 
variables in the model, the income elasticity for mileage is 
 
    
q
y

y
q
 a  2b ln y             (6) 
 
where a and b are the estimated coefficients on log(income) and (log[income])
2
, respectively, 
and lny is the average of log income for the category being considered. 
 
RESULTS 
The results of estimating the mileage equation using instrumental variables estimation are 
presented in Table 2. The results of the White test for heteroskedasticity and Ramsey RESET test 
for functional form fail to reject the null hypotheses of homoskedasticity and a correctly 
specified functional form, and thus the estimated model appears to satisfy the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions required to interpret the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The F-statistic 
indicates that the variables are jointly significant, while the value of R 
2
 indicates that roughly 
25% of the variation in mileage is explained by the model. This figure is comparable to the R 
2
 
value of 0.2941 yielded by the single-car household regression presented in Blow and Crawford 
(3), and the lower value presented here can be explained by the use of different data sets and the 
differences between the variables used by the two models, as explained above. 
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TABLE 2 Mileage equation results 
 
Dependent variable: ln(miles) 
Instrumental variables estimation, exclusion restrictions: regional average fuel price and 
regional average fuel efficiency. 
 
    Variable Coefficient Standard error Probability value 
        Real cost per mile -5.463368 1.270072 .0000 
ln(real income) 1.234870 .045068 .0000 
[ln(real income)]
2
 -.109789 .009501 .0000 
Age of head of household .043136 .005245 .0000 
[Age of head of household]
2 
-.000511 .000005 .0000 
Part-time employee -.063027 .055450 .2557 
Unemployed -.060200 .093283 .5187 
Retired -.147262 .045415 .0012 
Domestic work -.328915 .088462 .0002 
Self-employed -.077401 .034520 .0250 
Professional .181547 .044000 .0000 
Non-manual -.011004 .030021 .7140 
Skilled manual -.150971 .045488 .0009 
Number of children .127967 .013850 .0000 
Bus available and frequent -.207934 .037433 .0000 
Rail available and frequent -.106869 .035567 .0027 
Pop. density of LA < 3.5 p.p.ha .415392 .049966 .0000 
Pop. density of LA 3.5-9.9 p.p.ha .308604 .052064 .0000 
Pop. density of LA 10-19.9 p.p.ha .236058 .053123 .0000 
Pop. density of LA 20-34.9 p.p.ha .170632 .050229 .0007 
Standard region    
   North .193626 .067446 .0041 
   Yorkshire & Humberside .006604 .056826 .9075 
   East Midlands .031051 .055287 .5744 
   East Anglia -.042991 .074870 .5658 
   South East .098021 .041531 .0183 
   South West -.010362 .053457 .8463 
   West Midlands .217996 .050836 .0000 
   North West .131263 .051882 .0114 
   Wales & Scotland .073748 .064760 .2548 
Constant 7.202291 .254319 .0000 
   
N = 6230 F(30, 6199) = 72.19969 R
2
 = 0.252453 
   
R 
2
 = 0.248956 White F-stat = 0.160120 RESET F-stat = 
0.594963 
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Table 3 summarizes the estimated coefficients and the effects of the variables upon mileage. The 
tests for statistical significance were carried out at the 5% significance levels. The statistical 
significance of the key variables of real cost per mile and real household income mean that the 
simulated effects that tax increases have on households will be statistically significantly different 
from a first-order approximation that does not take behavioral responses into account. As 
discussed above, this means that a second-order approximation to the welfare effect will be 
significantly more accurate than a first-order approximation. 
 
TABLE 3 Summary of the main features of the regression results 
 
  Variable Results 
    Real cost per mile Real cost per mile has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on mileage, such that an increase in the 
real cost per mile causes a drop in mileage. 
 
Real household income Real income has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on mileage, but the rate of increase of mileage 
declines with income. 
 
Age of head of household Age has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
mileage, but the rate of increase of mileage declines with 
age. 
 
Number of children The number of children in the household has a positive 
and significant effect on mileage. 
 
Employment status of head of 
household 
All categories have lower mileage compared to full-time 
workers, although the effect is statistically significant 
only for the retired. 
 
Occupational class Professionals have increased mileage, and skilled manual 
workers reduced mileage, compared to an unskilled 
manual worker. The difference for non-manual workers 
is not statistically significant. 
 
Availability of public transport Available and frequent public transport services have a 
statistically significant negative impact on mileage. 
 
Population density Households in the least densely populated areas have 
significantly increased mileages compared to those in the 
most densely populated areas. 
 
Region Households in the North, the South East and the West 
Midlands have significantly increased mileages 
compared to London. None of the other standard regions 
have significantly different mileages. 
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Estimated elasticities 
The results from estimating the mileage equation have been used to calculate the own-price and 
income elasticities of the demand for mileage. These were calculated for 25 discrete groups of 
households, divided according to their income and the population density of their local authority. 
Figures 4 and 5 present the distribution of the own-price and income elasticities across these 
groups. 
As can be seen from the figures, the own-price elasticity generally declines with income and 
increases with population density, while the income elasticity declines steeply with income and 
shows no consistent pattern over population density. The greatest price sensitivity is shown by 
the poorest households living in the most densely populated areas, with an elasticity of –0.9271, 
while the smallest price response is shown by middle-income households in rural areas, with an 
elasticity of –0.749. Income elasticities vary between 0.6335 for the poorest households in the 
most densely populated areas, down to 0.0681 for the richest households living in rural areas. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 The distribution of the own-price elasticity of mileage, by income group and 
population density 
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FIGURE 5 The distribution of the income elasticity of mileage, by income group and 
population density 
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While the distribution of elasticities across income and population density is similar to those 
shown in Blow and Crawford (3), the magnitude and variability of those presented here are 
somewhat larger. The demand for mileage is rather more price-elastic, and more income-elastic 
for poorer households, although less income-elastic for richer households. Although Espey (7) 
suggests that the demand for mileage is becoming more price-elastic and less income-elastic over 
time, given the relatively short gap between the data used here and that used in Blow and 
Crawford (3), it is likely that other factors are responsible for much of the difference between the 
estimated elasticities. These factors include the possibility that the elasticities have been 
evaluated at different points on households’ demand curves and sampling variation. 
Although higher than the averages reported by Goodwin (8), Espey (7), Graham and Glaister 
(9) and Goodwin et al (10) the elasticities estimated in this study fall within the ranges reported 
by Espey (7), who reviews a number of articles published over a period of over 30 years. 
Graham and Glaister (9) report numbers showing that short-run price elasticities from studies 
based on household data tend to be higher than those from studies based on aggregate level data, 
which typically include commercial and consumer demand at a national or sub-national level. 
This may well explain the higher estimates produced in the present study. 
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Cost-of-living indices 
Using the estimated elasticities and the data on households’ expenditure on gasoline and the 
other components of the cost per mile of motoring taken from the 1999-2000 Family Expenditure 
Survey, cost-of-living indices were constructed to analyze the impact of an increase in road fuel 
duties on households’ welfare. As explained above, a 6% real increase in the duty on unleaded 
gasoline was considered. 
Using the latest prices (for October 2004), the duty on unleaded gasoline was 47.1 pence per 
litre or 57.8% of the retail price of unleaded (81.5 pence per litre). A 6% real rise in fuel duty 
raises the retail price of unleaded by 4% and the cost per mile of motoring by 1.9%. This price 
increase is fed into the second-order approximation to the welfare effect presented in equation 
(3), along with the estimated elasticities, in order to estimate the percentage increase in the cost-
of-living index for each income and population density quintile in the car-owning population. 
The results are presented in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 8 shows the effect of the same duty increase 
for all households, rather than car-owning households alone. 
Figure 6 shows that raising gasoline taxation has a strongly regressive effect on households’ 
cost-of-living when car-owning households alone are considered. While a 6% real increase in 
fuel duty raises the cost-of-living index of the richest group of households by 0.11%, it raises 
that of the poorest category of households by 0.76% –almost seven times as much. This 
regressive effect can be explained by the fact that low-income car-owning households spend a 
greater proportion of their income on gasoline than higher-income households (as Figure 3 
shows), so a rise in gasoline taxation that raises the retail price of gasoline will affect them more 
severely. Figure 8, however, presents a rather different picture of the effects of increased 
gasoline taxation when all households are considered, rather than just car-owning households. 
The cost-of-living index effect of a real increase in fuel duty is highest for middle-income 
groups. The difference between Figures 6 and 8 can be explained in terms of car-ownership: low-
income households are less likely to own a car and so, although an increase in gasoline taxation 
has a strong impact on those low-income households that do own a car, the poorest income 
quintile as a whole is less strongly affected. 
Figure 7 shows that a real increase in duty raises the cost-of-living index of car-owning 
households living in rural areas more than it does for car-owning households living in urban 
areas. It would be reasonable to suggest that this could be due to rural households having less 
flexibility in choosing their mileage than urban households, who are more likely to be able to 
substitute public transport, walking or cycling for private motoring. 
While the elasticities presented here are generally higher than those in Blow and Crawford 
(3), the effect of a 6% real increase in fuel duty on the cost-of-living indices is remarkably 
similar. 
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FIGURE 6 Effect of a 6% real increase in duty on cost-of-living for car-owning households, 
by income quintile 
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FIGURE 7 Effect of a 6% real increase in duty on cost-of-living for car-owning households, 
by population density 
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FIGURE 8 Effect of a 6% real increase in duty on cost-of-living for all households, by 
income quintile 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The fuel protests of 2000 brought the issue of gasoline taxation to the forefront of public debate, 
and much of the language used by the protestors was expressed in terms of concern for low-
income and rural households, who were widely perceived as suffering disproportionately from 
rising gasoline taxation. This analysis has attempted to assess the validity of such concerns. 
In this study, a mileage equation to predict the effect of a rise in gasoline taxation upon 
motorists’ mileage via the increase in the cost per mile of motoring that it produces has been 
estimated. It has been shown that a 1% real rise in CPM will decrease mileage by 0.93% for the 
poorest households living in the most densely populated areas, falling to 0.75% for middle-
income households in rural areas, ceteris paribus. Gasoline taxation therefore appears to be 
somewhat effective in reducing households’ mileage. 
The behavioral response estimated by the mileage equation was then used to assess the effect 
of a rise in gasoline taxation upon households’ welfare by constructing cost-of-living indices that 
measure the percentage increase in households’ income that they would need to achieve their 
pre-tax increase level of welfare. When all households are considered, middle-income 
households suffer the greatest increase in their cost-of-living index. However, amongst car-
owning households, an increase in gasoline taxation appears to be strongly regressive. Low-
income households are severely affected compared to all other income groups, and the welfare 
effect of the tax reform declines as income increases. Additionally, households in rural areas are 
more seriously affected by a rise in gasoline taxation than households in urban areas. 
From these results, it would appear that the arguments advanced in terms of the distributional 
consequences of gasoline taxation by the fuel protesters in the summer of 2000 are justified. 
While if all households are considered, middle-income households appear to suffer the burden of 
rising gasoline taxation, it is strongly regressive if car-owning households alone are considered. 
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If fuel duties were increased in the UK as had been originally planned for September 2004, there 
would be pervasive distributional impacts. 
However, it should be remembered that the model presented here is based upon a short-run 
mileage equation estimated using cross-sectional data. In the long-run, households have greater 
freedom to change their mileage in response to a rise in gasoline taxation because they can 
change the number and efficiency of the vehicles they own. This means that the income and 
own-price elasticities of the demand for mileage will be higher, and it could be expected that the 
welfare effect of a tax reform will be reduced. 
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